Departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Koon v. United States: More Discretion, Less Direction by Dezelan, Deborah E.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 72 | Issue 5 Article 16
February 2014
Departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
After Koon v. United States: More Discretion, Less
Direction
Deborah E. Dezelan
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Deborah E. Dezelan, Departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Koon v. United States: More Discretion, Less Direction, 72
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1679 (1997).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol72/iss5/16
CASE COMMENT
DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES AFTER KOON v. UNITED STATES:
MORE DISCRETION, LESS DIRECTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Many commentators and district court judges complain that
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines), sentencing
judges must follow overly rigid sentencing instructions, are held to
narrow sentencing ranges, and possess little discretion to depart from
the Guidelines.' They argue that judges need more flexibility in sen-
tencing than is allowed under the present structure of the Guidelines,
as the Guidelines do not allow them to consider the context of the
specific case or the individual characteristics of the specific offender.2
Judges are able to deviate from the sentencing ranges only when a
case is "atypical," or different from the "heartland" of cases encoun-
tered with a given federal crime. However, this discretion is limited:
the factors that the judge relies upon for departures must be specifi-
cally enumerated and justified on the record, the factor cannot be
expressly forbidden by the Guidelines, and the factor must, usually,
exist at an extraordinary level. Furthermore, prior to Koon v. United
1 See, e.g., W. Travis Parham, Note, Grist for the Mill of Sentencing Guideline Reform:
Williams v. United States, 28 WAKE FoREST L. REV. 487, 498 (1993) ('judicial animos-
ity toward the Sentencing Commission and the guidelines themselves is one of the
major problems facing the sentencing guidelines."). The author presents several ex-
amples where judges have shown their dissatisfaction with being unable to depart
from the Guidelines more freely. See also Lisa M. Rebello, Note, Sentencing Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Five Years of "Guided Discretion", 26 SuFFoLK U. L. REv.
1031, 1054 (1992) ("[Clourts and commentators have strongly criticized the Guide-
lines for restricting traditional judicial discretion in the sentencing process .... ").
2 See, e.g., CharlesJ. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1938, 1956-58 (1988) ("To rectify the guide-
lines' principal shortcomings, the Commission should propose to Congress specific
amendments designed to increase judges' discretion to consider a broad range of
individual offender characteristics.") Id. at 1056.
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States,3 the sentencing judge's decision to depart had been subject to
plenary review by appellate courts, which allowed the circuit courts to
substitute their own opinions for those of the district courts. Finally,
to frustrate further the ability to depart from the Guidelines, Congress
has given limited guidance to the courts on how to make a departure
decision.
The United States Supreme Court, through its decision in Koon,
has modified and simplified the appellate review process and has
given more discretion to the district courts by changing the proper
standard of review from de novo to abuse of discretion. However, the
mechanics of the departure process itself remain unclear.
This Comment first reviews, in Part II, the unique background of
the Koon case and the context in which the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. Part III summarizes Congress's intent in enacting the Sen-
tencing Reform Act of 1984, which created the basis for the Guide-
lines. Additionally, this part outlines the mechanics of using the
Guidelines and describes the appellate review process before the
Supreme Court's Koon decision. Part IV sets forth the Guideline ap-
plication and appellate review in the lower courts' Koon cases, and
more fully explains the Supreme Court's decision in Koon v. United
States. Part V surveys federal appellate court cases attempting to apply
the Supreme Court's decision. Although many circuit courts have cor-
rectly applied the standard of review mandated by Koon, some circuits
have attempted to maintain their power of departure reversals by mis-
applying the opinion. In addition, Koon leaves open many other as-
pects of the departure process and ability to review departure
decisions. Finally, Part VI concludes that the Supreme Court's deci-
sion appropriately modifies the standard of review for departures
from the Guidelines, but leaves open for clarification the mechanics
of the departure process. This Comment proposes a potential solu-
tion to the difficulties of sentencing departures which may help pro-
vide a proper balance between the district court's departure
discretion and the circuit court's ability to check that discretion.
II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE INFAMOUS KOOV CASE
On the evening of March 2, 1991, Rodney King and his friends
took a drive on a Los Angeles freeway after a night of drinking malt
liquor in King's car. Police officers spotted King driving in excess of
100 m.p.h. and attempted to pull him over. After an extended chase,
he finally pulled off the freeway and drove eight more miles to the
3 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996).
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entrance of a recreation area. Once stopped, the police officers ap-
proached the car and immediately ordered King and his friends to
exit the car and assume the felony prone position-that is, to lie flat
on the ground with their hands behind their heads. Although his
friends complied, King did not. He did get down on his hands and
knees, but when the police officers tried to force him down he resisted
and became combative. The officers retreated to a more safe position
and shot King with taser darts in an attempt to subdue him. King
then became more combative and charged after one of the police of-
ficers. The officer struck King on the side of the head with his baton,
and King fell to the ground. He attempted to rise but the officers
struck him repeatedly to keep him down. Finally, King's resistance
subsided and he lay prone. Nevertheless, the officers did not end
their behavior; they continued to strike King on his legs and on his
chest, and they "stomped" on him and kicked him for almost half a
minute more before handcuffing King and placing him in the police
car. The "officers then took King to the hospital, where he was treated
for a fractured leg, multiple facial fractures, and numerous bruises
and contusions.4
Few in America have not seen the bystander's famous video taken
that night at the recreation area capturing this beating on tape. And
after a Californiajury acquitted the Los Angeles police officers of state
charges of assaulting King, the response of violent rioting that took
place for three days in Los Angeles brought further controversy and
notoriety to the case. Because the state criminal system appeared to
have failed, two of the officers, Sergeant Stacey Koon and Officer Law-
rence Powell, were eventually tried in federal court and convicted of
violating King's constitutional rights under color of law, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 242.5 Although a straightforward application of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines prescribed a sentence of 70-to-87 months impris-
onment for Koon and Powell, the trial court judge, because of
unusual case circumstances, greatly departed from that range; the
judge sentenced the defendants to only 30 months in prison, less than
4 See id. at 2041.
5 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994), which states in part:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, or District to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States . . . shall be fined under this
title; ... and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation of
this section or if such acts include the use . . . of a dangerous
weapon .... [the defendant] shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than ten years ....
IL997] 3L68i
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
half the original minimum sentence length. In response, the govern-
ment appealed the sentence arguing that the judge considered invalid
case circumstances, or factors, in justifying the sentence outside the
Guideline range. The Ninth Circuit, using a de novo standard of re-
view, agreed with the government and reversed the departures. The
defendants appealed that ruling.
6
As a result of these appeals, the notoriety of this case did not end
with the state trial, violent riots, and ultimate federal convictions of
Koon and Powell. The United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari on the sentencing issue. On June 13, 1996, the Court issued its
opinion, unanimously changing the standard of review for sentencing
departures to a more lenient abuse of discretion standard.7 Using this
standard of review, a majority of the Court upheld most of the factors
the District Court used to justify the downward departures.8
The Koon decision seeks to resolve an important issue which has
been at the heart of debates over the effectiveness of the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines since their enactment in 1987: the amount of dis-
cretion which should be left to sentencing judges.9 Under previous
sentencing practice, federal judges enjoyed wide discretion in making
sentencing decisions and appellate review of those decisions was very
limited. Congress, through the Guidelines, sought to replace such an
unstructured sentencing practice because it resulted in wide disparity
in sentence lengths for similarly situated defendants who committed
similar crimes.' 0 The Guidelines' goal is to reduce such disparity by
requiring sentencing judges to impose, in the typical case, a sentence
within a given narrow range. 1 This requirement should lead to
greater consistency in sentencing. However, Congress did not intend
to remove all of the sentencing judges' discretion, recognizing that a
fair system would allow for the flexibility of modified sentences when
unusual, or unforeseen circumstances exist in a case. The Guidelines
therefore give the sentencing judge the ability to depart upwards or
downwards from a prescribed range in those cases which present
6 See Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2041-43.
7 See id. at 2043.
8 See id. at 2053.
9 See Michael S. Gelacak et al., Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: An
Empirical andJurisprudential Analysis, 81 MINN. L. REv. 299, 318 & n.82 (1996). "[T] he
scope of the departure provision serves as the key battleground between those urging
greater uniformity and those urging greater flexibility." Id. at 318.
10 See Ogletree, supra note 2, at 1944; Honorable Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R.
Kipp, An Examination of Emerging Departure Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, (1991).
11 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, cmt. 4(g) (1995); 18
U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 994(b) (2) (1995).
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unique factors, unlike the typical case. 12 But the Guidelines must not
allow sentencing judges to use their freedom to depart too frequently,
or the goal of reduced sentencing disparity would be lost. Congress
therefore allowed for appellate review of departures, initiated by
either the government or the defendant, as a way to check these dis-
cretionary decisions. Thus, although necessary, an inherent conflict
exists between the sentencing judge's need for freedom to depart
from the Guidelines to treat each defendant fairly and the appellate
role of limiting, or controlling, such discretion to reduce disparity.
The Supreme Court decided to limit the appellate role in depar-
ture decisions. The Koon decision reduces the chance that an appel-
late court will replace its viewpoint for that of the trial court's. Under
an abuse of discretion standard, a district court's decision to depart
will be given greater weight.
Although the Justices of the Supreme Court were unanimous in
their decision about the abuse of discretion standard of review, the
Justices disagreed about whether the factors the District Court relied
upon actually made the case atypical, warranting the sentence reduc-
tion. This alone suggests that both the district and circuit courts need
more explicit guidance regarding when departure decisions are al-
lowed than what Congress or the Sentencing Commission has sup-
plied. Without such guidance, neither goal of uniformity or fairness
can be fully achieved, regardless of the appellate courts' standard of
review.
III. HISTORY AND APPLICATION
OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
A. Purposes of the Guidelines
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, dis-
trict courtjudges enjoyed wide discretion in sentence determinations.
Statutes specified the penalties for each crime, and the judge was
given wide latitude in determining which factors to take into account
in the sentencing phase and how long the offender should be incar-
cerated, given parole, or both.13 This broad discretion was further
enhanced by the limited role of appellate courts. Before the Guide-
lines, a criminal defendant could appeal the sentence imposed only if
it exceeded the statutory maximum, and the government could never
appeal a criminal sentence. In addition, the review process was lim-
ited: "[0] nce it is determined that a sentence is within the limitations
12 See U.S. SENTENCrNG GUIDELINES Manual ch. 1, pt. A, cmt. 4(b) (1995).
13 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989).
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set forth in the statute under which it is imposed, appellate review is at
an end.1 4 Inevitably, such a system resulted in unpredictable and
widely disparate sentence lengths for identical crimes. 15
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA)16 was enacted to re-
place such sentencing practices with a more effective, fair sentencing
system. 17 Specifically, Congress sought to achieve three objectives
through the use of a structured set of sentencing rules: (1) honesty in
sentencing by avoiding confusion and implicit deception in the fact
that sentences were indeterminate; (2) uniformity in sentencing by nar-
rowing the wide disparity that historically existed; and (3) proportional-
ity in sentencing by imposing appropriately different sentences for
criminal conduct of varying severity.' 8 Inherent in these objectives ex-
ists a tension between the two competing goals of uniformity and pro-
portionality. Complete uniformity, in its most simple terms, would
lump all violators of a given crime into one category corresponding to
a given sentence length. This would not allow for the flexibility, how-
ever, to vary sentences in cases which warrant different treatment, de-
stroying proportionality. However, the more a sentencing system
attempts to be flexible in treating cases differently, the less managea-
ble, or uniform, the system becomes.' 9 As a result, Congress envi-
sioned the Guidelines "to provide a structure for evaluating the
fairness and appropriateness of the sentence for an individual of-
fender, [but] not to eliminate the thoughtful imposition of individual-
ized sentences." 20 Attempting to achieve this balance between
uniformity and proportionality, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3553,
which states, in part:
14 Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974).
15 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 98-225, at 44-45 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N.
3182, 3227-28. The Senate Report provides several studies confirming the great dis-
parity in sentencing. For example, one study surveyed 208 active federal judges and
found that the mean prison term the judges would impose in one hypothetical bank
robbery case was 7.3 years, with a maximum sentence length of 25 years and a stan-
dard deviation of 6.1 years. See also Rebello, supra note 1, at 1033-34 (noting that
prior to the Sentencing Reform Act, sentences for similar crimes varied greatly and
the sentence often depended upon the geographical region and the sentencing
judge).
16 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994)).
17 See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 52 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. 3182, 3235.
18 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A., cmt. 3 (1995).
19 See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises
Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 13 (1988).
20 S. REP. No. 98-225, at 52 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3235.
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The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range
[given in the Guidelines], unless the court finds that there exists an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree,
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commis-
sion in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence
different from that described. In determining whether a circum-
stance was adequately taken into consideration, the court shall con-
sider only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official
commentary of the Sentencing Commission.
2 '
This is the statute which grants sentencing judges the authority to
depart from the Guideline ranges in appropriate circumstances, and
is the only guidance Congress has given to the courts.
Congress also allowed for the review of sentencing departures "to
assure that the guidelines are applied properly."22 In contrast with
past practice, these appeals may be made by either the defendant or
the government because,
[i]t is clearly desirable, in the interest of unwarranted sentence dis-
parity, to permit the government.., to appeal and have increased a
sentence that is below the applicable guideline and that is found to
be unreasonable. If only the defendant could appeal his sentence
there would be no effective opportunity for the reviewing courts to
correct the injustice arising from a sentence that was patently too
lenient.
23
The SRA also created a permanent administrative agency, the
United States Sentencing Commission (Commission),24 to set out the
specifics of the envisioned Guidelines in accordance with Congress's
instructions.2 5 The Commission continually monitors and reviews the
application of the Guidelines at both the trial and appellate court
levels,2 6 and recommends, with the knowledge gained from experi-
ence, modifications and amendments to the Guidelines to Congress
each year.
2 7
Following Congress's specific mandates, the Commission created
a Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, commonly referred to as the
"Guidelines." The violation of almost every federal criminal law corre-
21 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994).
22 S. REP. No. 98-225, at 151(1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. 3182, 3334.
23 Id.
24 See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1994).
25 See generally id.
26 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(6) (1994).
27 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p)-(r). To date, 540 such recommendations have been
approved by Congress and amended to the Guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINEs MANuA. app. C (Supp. 1996).
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sponds to a Guideline section in Chapter Two of the manual.2 8 As a
starting point for the sentencing ranges, the Commission attempted,
if possible and appropriate, to account for any characteristics of a
crime or criminal defendant which appeared to affect pre-Guideline
sentencing, with the ranges representing an "average" of the those
pre-Guideline sentences.2 9 And in conformity with congressional
mandate, the Commission kept these sentencing ranges narrow; the
maximum of the range does not exceed the minimum by more than
the greater of either six months or twenty-five percent.30 Such a limi-
tation on the range of sentencing improves the uniformity of
sentences imposed upon offenders who fall within the same categories
of offense behavior and offender characteristics. A sentencing judge
is free to choose a sentence within the Guideline range, and may con-
sider, among other factors, the background, character, and conduct
of the defendant.
3'
B. Operation of the Guidelines
The Guidelines employ a matrix, or table, of applicable sentenc-
ing ranges. The total "Offense Level" (between one and forty-three)
forms the vertical axis, and the defendant's "Criminal History Cate-
gory" (between I and VI) forms the horizontal axis. The intersection
of these two variables provides a Guideline range, given in months of
imprisonment.
3 2
To begin determining the total offense level, each Guideline sec-
tion, in Chapter Two of the Guidelines Manual, provides a base of-
fense level and specific offense characteristic adjustments a judge can
rely upon to modify the offense level, if appropriate. Next, adjust-
ments from Parts A, B, and C of Chapter Three, pertaining to the
victim, the role of the defendant in the offense, and any obstruction
ofjustice, are also applied to the offense level, if appropriate. 33 These
28 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, cmt. 5
(1995) ("[T]he guidelines will apply to more than 90 percent of all felony and Class A
misdemeanor cases in the federal courts. Because of time constraints and the nonex-
istence of statistical information, some offenses that occur infrequently are not con-
sidered in the guidelines.").
29 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, cmt. 3 (1995).
30 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b) (2). These ranges do overlap to some degree, to discour-
age unnecessary litigation. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, cmt.
4(h) (1995).
31 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.4 (1995). A sentence within
this range is not appealable. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1994).
32 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (1995).
33 See id. ch. 3.
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adjustments are considered "guided" because they provide specific
guidance in both the numerical level of adjustment and offense or
offender characteristics. 3 4 Finally, an adjustment for acceptance of re-
sponsibility, if appropriate, is applied to obtain the total offense
level.35 Chapter Four is used to determine the defendant's criminal
history category, which depends upon the number of previous convic-
tions and the circumstances surrounding those convictions. Using the
intersection of the total offense level and the offender's criminal his-
tory category, a sentencing "range" is provided by the matrix.3 6
Although most cases should result in sentences within the Guide-
line range, the sentencing judge has the ability to depart from the
given range if the judge feels that the Guideline section fails to reflect
adequately a pertinent "aggravating or mitigating circumstance."37 In
formulating the Guidelines, the Commission
[i]ntends the sentencing courts to treat each guideline as carving
out a "heartland," a set of typical cases embodying the conduct that
each guideline describes. When a court finds an atypical case, one
to which a particular guideline linguistically applies but where con-
duct significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider
whether a departure is warranted. 38
Such departures are termed "unguided." The Commission pro-
vides some examples, in Chapter Five of the Guidelines Manual, of
factors which a sentencing judge could use to depart; however, the
number of potential factors which might warrant departure in a given
case cannot be comprehensively listed in advance. The sentencing
judge may therefore justify this type of a departure based on men-
tioned or unmentioned factors. In addition, the extent of an "un-
guided" departure is left to the discretion of the trial court, although
the extent is subject to review for "reasonableness."3 9 Congress be-
34 See id. ch. 1, pt. A, cmt. 4(b).
35 See id. ch. 3, pt. E.
36 See Breyer, supra note 19, at 34.
37 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994); see also S. REP. No. 98-225, at 52 (1983), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3235.
38 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNS MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, cmt. 4(b) (1995).
39 See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1994). A good example of the use of the Guidelines is
described in JiMMY GURULt, COMPLEX CRImINAL LmGATION: PROSECUTING DRUG EN-
TERPRISES AND ORGANIZED CRimE 606-07 (1996), which follows a basic seven step
process:
(1) Look up the robbery statute in the statutory index. The index will lead
the judge to Guideline § 2B3.1 ("Robbery").
(2) Find the "base offense level" for "Robbery" (Level "18").
(3) Add "specific offense characteristics." In this case, add two levels for the
money taken and three more levels for the gun.
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lieved that, based upon previous experience, these departures might
be appropriate in up to twenty percent of the cases.4°
In Chapter Five, the Guidelines Manual first gives specific exam-
ples of factors which a judge is forbidden to consider, regardless of
whether or not they take the case outside of the heartland of cases in
the court's opinion. These "forbidden" factors include the defend-
ant's race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, socio-economic status,
and lack of guidance as a youth. 41 Second, the Guidelines list several
factors that the Commission recognized it was not able to fully take
into account in formulating the Guidelines. These are "encouraged"
departure factors, which "may warrant departure from the guide-
(4) Determine if any "adjustments" from chapter 3 of the Guidelines apply.
They include adjustments for a vulnerable victim or an official victim,
abduction of the victim, role in the offense, efforts to obstruct justice,
acceptance of responsibility, and rule for multiple counts.
(5) Calculate a criminal history score on the basis of the offender's past
conviction record. Here, § 4A1.1 assigns three points for one prior seri-
ous conviction.
(6) Look at the table on page 5.2 of the Guidelines to determine the sen-
tence. Here, an offense level of "23," with three points for the prior
conviction, yields a range of fifty-one to sixty-three months in prison for
this armed robbery by a previously convicted felon.
(7) Impose the Guideline sentence, or, if the court finds unusual factors,
depart and impose a non-Guideline sentence. Thejudge must then give
reasons for departure, and the appellate courts may then review the
"reasonableness" of the resulting sentence.
(citing Breyer, supra note 19, at 6; various U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL sec-
tions; and 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1994)).
40 See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 52 n.71 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C-A.N. 3182,
3235.
The United States Parole Commission currently sets prison release dates
outside its guidelines in about 20 percent of the cases in its jurisdiction. It is
anticipated that judges will impose sentences outside the sentencing guide-
lines at about the same rate or possibly at a somewhat lower rate since the
sentencing guidelines should contain recommendations of appropriate
sentences for more detailed combinations of offense and offender character-
istics than do the parole guidelines.
The most frequently used "departure" is substantial assistance to the government,
which is usually used as part of a plea bargain. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MAN-
UAL § 5K1.1 (1995). In 1995, the Sentencing Commission's Annual Report showed
that such "Substantial Assistance Departures" occurred in 19.7% of Guideline cases,
and "Other Downward Departures" occurred in 8.4% of all cases. See Francesca D.
Bowman, Has Koon Undermined the Guidelines?, 9 FED. SENTENCING REP. 32, 33 n.2
(1996).
41 For a complete list, see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.4, p.s.,
5H1.10, p.s., 5K2.12, p.s. (1995).
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lines.., in the discretion of the sentencing court" 42 if the Guideline
section does not already take that factor into account. If the en-
couraged factor is already taken into account by the Guideline sec-
tion, "departure from the applicable guideline range is warranted only
if the factor is present to a degree substantially in excess of that which
ordinarily is involved in the offense."43 Examples include such aggra-
vating factors as death, physical or extreme psychological injury, prop-
erty damage, and extreme conduct, which would warrant upward
departures. Mitigating factors are also provided, such as victim mis-
conduct, coercion and duress, and diminished capacity, which would
warrant downward departures. Third, the Commission lists several
"discouraged" factors, commonly involving certain offender character-
istics, which are not ordinarily relevant in departure decisions, but may
become relevant when present to an unusual degree. Examples of
these discouraged factors include age, mental and emotional condi-
tion, physical condition or drug dependence, and employment rec-
ord.44 Beyond the enumerated potential departure factors, the
Commission recognizes that "the guidelines pursuant to this provision
cannot, by their very nature, be comprehensively listed and analyzed
in advance."45
When faced with a situation where the potentially unusual factor
is not mentioned in the Guidelines, a court must decide whether the
factor makes the case atypical enough to take it outside of the heart-
land by considering the "structure and theory of both relevant individ-
ual guidelines and the Guidelines taken as a whole."4 However, the
Commission believed that departures based upon unmentioned fac-
tors would be "highly infrequent."47
Finally, if the sentencing judge decides to depart, "[t] he court...
shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particu-
lar sentence, and, if the sentence ... is outside the [Guideline] range,
42 Id. § 5K2.0, p.s.
43 Id. (emphasis added).
44 For an interesting analysis of the Commission's departure guidance, see Gela-
cak et al., supra note 9, at 316-17. The authors parallel the language in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b) "of a kind" as a "qualitative" type of departure, representing factors which
are of a kind the Commission encourages judges to use as departure bases if not
already taken into consideration by the Guideline section, and "to a degree" as "quan-
titative" departures, representing discouraged factors which ajudge cannot use unless
the circumstance is present to an extraordinary degree. See also Selya & Kipp, supra
note 10, at 22.
45 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNES MANUAL § 5K2.0, p.s. (1995).
46 Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2045 (1996) (quoting United States v.
Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir. 1993)).
47 U.S. SENTENCING GuIDEUNEs MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, cmt. 4(b) (1995).
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... [state] the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence differ-
ent from [the applicable range] ."48
C. Appellate Review of a Departure Decision Prior to Koon v.
United States
To ensure consistent application of the Guidelines by district
courts, Congress provided for a limited amount of appellate review
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742. This statute provides an opportunity for the
defendant or the government to appeal a sentence which was: (1) im-
posed in violation of the law; (2) imposed as a result of an incorrect
application of the Sentencing Guidelines; or (3) imposed for an of-
fense for which there is no Sentencing Guideline and is plainly unrea-
sonable. In addition, the criminal defendant may appeal an imposed
sentence which is greater than the sentence specified in the applica-
ble Guideline range (an upward departure), and the government may
appeal a sentence which is less than the Guideline range (a downward
departure) .49 The statute also addresses the appropriate standard of
review for such appeals:
The court of appeals shall give due regard to the opportunity of the
district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and shall ac-
cept the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly
erroneous and shall give due deference to the district court's appli-
cation of the guidelines to the facts.
50
Further, the appellate court shall consider whether the sentence
"is outside of the applicable guideline range, and is unreasonable."
5I
If so, the appellate court must set aside the sentence and remand the
case.5
2
Despite the language in the statute that appellate courts should
give "due deference" to the trial court's application of the Guidelines,
the circuit courts commonly decided that decisions to depart from the
Guidelines, in part, involve interpretations of the Guidelines. Statu-
tory interpretations are questions of law; therefore, the appellate
courts could review de novo that portion of the departure decision.
48 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (1994).
49 See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), (b).
50 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e).
51 18 U.S.C. § 3742(0.
52 See id.
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The most widely followed departure review analysis53 was first
enumerated by the First Circuit in United States v. Diaz-Villafane.54 The
court divided the task of reviewing whether the trial court properly
departed from the Guidelines into three determinations:55
(1) Whether the circumstances relied on by the district court
"are of a kind or degree that they may appropriately be relied upon to
justify departure .... " 56 This, the court decided, is a question of law
which the appellate court could ascertain as easily as the trial court,
and was therefore subject to de novo review.
(2) Whether "the circumstances ... actually exist in the particu-
lar case."57 This is a factual determination which should be set aside
only upon a finding of clear error.
(3) Whether the record supports "the direction and degree of
departure."-58 This question should be measured by a standard of rea-
sonableness due to the trial courts' superior "feel" for the case and bet-
ter ability to judge the relative unusualness of the case. This portion
of the review process also takes into account the "unreasonable" lan-
guage of the statute.
The circuit courts of appeals began to rely upon this tripartite test
rather than the statute itself, leading them astray from Congress's
original instructions. Consider, for example, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals' difficulty in consistently and properly applying the
test. In the Second Circuit case United States v. Lara,59 the district
court had decided to depart downward from a range of 121-to-151
months to 60 months, the mandatory minimum, because of the unu-
sual circumstances of the case. The defendant was a "delicate looking
man" who was chronologically twenty-two years old, but looked six-
teen. He was admittedly bisexual and, during pre-sentence incarcera-
tion, he had been threatened with being forced to become a male
prostitute. The prison officials decided that the only way to protect
53 This test was followed by a majority of the circuits in some similar form. See,
e.g., United States v. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Feekes, 929 F.2d 334, 336 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Weaver, 920 F.2d 1570,
1573 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 602-03 (2d Cir. 1990);
United States v. Shuman, 902 F.2d 873, 875-76 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Lang, 898 F.2d 1378, 1379-80 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. White, 893 F.2d 276,
277-78 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Rodriguez, 882 F.2d 1059, 1067 (6th Cir.
1989).
54 874 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1989).
55 See id. at 49-50.
56 Id. at 49.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 905 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1990).
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the defendant was to place him in solitary confinement. Because of
the extent of the defendant's vulnerability to prison abuse and the
more harsh punishment the defendant would receive if left in solitary
confinement, the sentencing judge decided the factor was a mitigat-
ing circumstance not adequately taken into consideration by the Sen-
tencing Commission, thereby warranting the downward departure.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, using a test similar to the
tripartite test used in Diaz-Villafane, upheld the sentence. Under a de
novo standard of review, the court agreed that the factor of extreme
vulnerability to prison abuse found in the present case was not consid-
ered by the Commission in formulating the Guidelines, and therefore
was appropriately relied upon by the district court.
The problem with using the tripartite test for reviewing depar-
tures becomes evident when future cases attempt to follow precedent.
About a year after the Lara decision, the Second Circuit reviewed an-
other, very similar case of downward departure due to potential abuse
in prison in United States v. Gonzalez.60 Again, the facts showed that the
defendant was small and feminine looking, and, although he was
nineteen, he resembled a fourteen- or fifteen-year old boy. Unlike
Lara, however, the defendant in this case was neither gay nor bisexual,
and had not already been victimized in prison. Also in contrast to
Lara, the Second Circuit only reviewed the district court's departure
decision for findings of fact using a clearly erroneous standard-only
following the second part of the tripartite analysis. The Circuit Court
decided that Lara had already determined that "potential for victimi-
zation in prison" was a valid departure factor. Therefore, the court
easily affirmed the sentence departure, without ever reviewing the ini-
tial question of whether this case presented mitigating circumstances
"of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by
the Sentencing Commission." 6 1 The short-cut provided by the tripar-
60 945 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1991).
61 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994). The dissent did reach the question, however, and
recognized that the Lara decision did not stand for the proposition that a downward
departure may be based upon a prisoner's potential vulnerability to physical assault,
but only that "such an extraordinary situation [exists in the Lara case] because of the
defendant's particular vulnerability due to his immature appearance, sexual orienta-
tion and fragility. The severity of [that defendant's] prison term is exacerbated by his
placement in solitary confinement as the only means of segregating him from other
inmates." GonzaLez, 945 F.2d at 527-28 (Winter, J., dissenting) (citing Lara, 905 F.2d
at 603).
Judge Winter would not have extended the Lara holding to the present case,
however, concluding that "I cannot say that the Commission did not take this factor
[as it exists in the present case] into account." Further, he warned that anticipating
that a given defendant may be subject to physical assault in prison is entirely subjec-
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tite test suggested that a circuit court could declare a general "circum-
stance," or factor, as always justifying or forbidding departure. The
Supreme Court's Koon decision, as will be explained in Part IV, ad-
dresses this presumed authority and concludes that it would "trans-
gress the policymaking authority vested in the Commission."62
A step towards the Supreme Court's Koon decision took place in
1993 when the First Circuit reconsidered its tripartite test of appellate
review, and modified it somewhat, in United States v. Rivera.63 The
court continued to use the three-part test, but the de novo review of
question one, whether the circumstances relied upon by the district
court "are of a kind or degree that they may appropriately be relied
upon to justify departure,"64 was further explained. Then-Chief Cir-
cuitJudge Breyer,65 writing for the court, recognized that the first in-
quiry involves both questions of law, requiring de novo review, and
questions of fact, .requiring a deferential standard. De novo review
would be appropriate where the question on review is quintessentially
legal,66 including whether or not the allegedly special circumstances
are of the kind that the Guidelines, in principle, permit the sentenc-
ing court to consider at all. For example, de novo review, and depar-
ture reversal, would be appropriate when the factor relied upon by
the district court was "forbidden" by the Guidelines, or "discouraged,"
but relied upon without explaining how the case was special. Simi-
tive, and "[t]he number of defendants eligible for a downward departure on that
ground [would be] virtually unlimited, and the Guidelines' goal of uniformity
[would] be thoroughly subverted." Gonzale, 945 F.2d at 529 (Winter, J., dissenting).
In an apparent response to these cases (see Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035,
2050-51 (1996)), the United States Sentencing Commission, with Congress's ap-
proval, amended the discouraged factors enumerated in U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5H1.4 on November 1, 1991, replacing the words "Physical condition is not
ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the guide-
lines" with the words "Physical condition or appearance, including physique, is not ordi-
narily relevant.. .. " See U.S. SENTENCING GtnDLINES MANuAL app. C, amend. 386
(1995) (emphasis added). Of course, this does not leave out the possibility of ex-
traordinary circumstances which would make physical appearance relevant, such as
the conditions present in Lara.
62 Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2055.
63 994 F.2d 942 (1993).
64 See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
65 In addition to the significance of his role in Pivera, "[i] t is logical to assume
that [Koon v. United States] is of particular interest to Justice Breyer [because] [a]s a
former member of the United States Sentencing CommissionJustice Breyer is viewed
as a principal architect of the Sentencing Guidelines." Douglas W. Kmiec, "Beating
Sense" into Federal Sentencing-The Aftermath of the Rodney King Case, 1996 PREv Ew U.S.
Sup. CT. CAS. 196, 197.
66 See Rivera, 994 F.2d at 951.
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larly, plenary review would be appropriate when the task is purely one
of statutory interpretation; that is, the interpretation of the drafter's
intent in using a set of words. However, a deferential standard would
be required when an appellate court is reviewing "whether the given
circumstances, as seen from the district court's unique vantage point,
are usual or unusual, ordinary or not ordinary, and to what extent."
67
Such a deferential standard is justified because the district court has a
better "feel" for the unique circumstances of a particular case, and has
observed many more ordinary Guideline cases for comparison
purposes.
68
Judge Breyer also set forth a useful analysis for guiding district
courts in departure decisions. The Supreme Court, in the Koon deci-
sion, agreed with this analysis:
69
[W] e suggest... that, as an initial matter, a sentencing court con-
sidering departure analyze the case along the following lines:
1) What features of this case, potentially, take it outside the Guide-
lines' "heartland" and make of it a special, or unusual, case?
2) Has the Commission forbidden departures based on those
features?
3) If not, has the Commission encouraged departures based on
those features?
4) If not, has the Commission discouraged departures based on
those features?
If no special features are present, or if special features are also
"forbidden" features, then the sentencing court, in all likelihood,
simply would apply the relevant [G]uidelines. If the special features
are "encouraged" features, the court would likely depart, [if the ap-
plicable Guideline section does not already take that feature into
account]. If the special features are "discouraged" features, [or an
encouraged factor already taken into account by the applicable
Guideline section], the court would go on to decide whether the
case is nonetheless not "ordinary," i.e., whether the case differs [to
an exceptional degree or in some other way makes the case differ-
ent] from the ordinary case in which those features are present. If
the case is ordinary, the court would not depart. If it is not ordi-
nary, the court would go on to consider departure. 70
67 Id.
68 For example, in 1994, 93.9% of Guideline cases were not appealed and there-
fore were not observed by the circuit courts. See Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct.
2035, 2047 (1996).
69 See id. at 2045.
70 Rivera, 994 F.2d at 949. Additional words reconcile judge Breyer's analysis with
the Koon decision.
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Judge Breyer went on to explain that this analysis does not help
in the case of unusual features not mentioned in the Guidelines. In
such a case, the district judge must make ajudgment about whether a
departure is appropriate, given the structure and theory of the indi-
vidual guidelines and the Guidelines taken as a whole. 71 The court
must also "bear[ ] in mind the Commission's expectation that depar-
tures based on grounds not mentioned in the Guidelines will be
'highly infrequent."' 7 2
Although Riveras modified approach seems more consistent with
the intent of 18 U.S.C. § 3742, the circuit courts which originally
adopted the Diaz-Villafane tripartite test did not embrace this more
deferential standard of review.73 By granting certiorari in the Koon v.
United States case, the Supreme Court would resolve this split between
the circuits, and decide whether decisions to depart from the Guide-
lines should be reviewed under the de novo standard most circuits
used or the deferential standard of Rivera.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
IN KOON V. UNITED STATES
A. The United States District Court Decision
After Koon and Powell were convicted of violating King's consti-
tutional rights under color of law, the United States District Court for
the Central District of California applied the Sentencing Guidelines.
Guideline section 2H1.4 applies to violations of 18 U.S.C. § 242, de-
priving civil rights under color of law, and prescribes a base offense
level which is the greater of: 10, or 6 plus the offense level applicable
to any underlying offense. 74 In this case, the underlying offense was
aggravated assault, corresponding to section 2A2.2, which carries a
base offense level of 15,75 to which 6 was added for a total of 21. The
district court then applied two guided upward adjustments as specifi-
cally enumerated in section 2A2.2: four levels for the use of dangerous
weapons, and two levels because King sustained bodily injury during
71 See id.
72 Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2045 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNES MANUAL ch. 1,
pt. A (1995)).
73 See GURUiI, supra note 39, at 683 ("A substantial majority of circuits have
adopted the three-part analysis for appellate review enunciated by the First Circuit in
Diaz-ViUafane These circuits, however, do not embrace the deferential standard ar-
ticulated in Rivera.").
74 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2H1.4 (1992).
75 See id. § 2A2.2(a).
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the crime.76 With a total offense level of 27, and with a criminal his-
tory category of I (Koon and Powell had no previous convictions), the
corresponding sentencing range was 70-to-87 months. However, us-
ing unguided departure criteria, the court decided to depart down-
ward from this range a total of eight levels because of the
extraordinary circumstances present in the case. Specifically, the
courtjustified five levels of the departure because "the victim's wrong-
ful conduct contributed significantly to provoking the offense behav-
ior."77 This departure factor is encouraged by the Sentencing
Commission, although the extent of departure remains unguided.
78
The Court justified an additional three levels of downward departure
based upon the existence and combination of four factors,79 or miti-
gating circumstances, which standing alone do not justify departure,
but when "taken together, justify a reduced sentence."80 None of
these four factors are specifically mentioned in the Guidelines. The
mitigating factors include the following circumstances: (1) the de-
fendants were likely to be targets of abuse in prison because of the
widespread publicity of the case; (2) Koon and Powell would be dis-
qualified from future employment in law enforcement, and suffer the
"anguish and disgrace these deprivations entail, [which] will consti-
tute substantial punishment in addition to any court imposed sen-
76 Seeid. § 2A2.2(b) (2) (B), (b)(3)(A) (1992); United States v. Koon, 833 F. Supp.
769 (C.D. Cal. 1993), af['d in part, vacated in part, 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1994), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996).
77 Koon, 833 F. Supp. at 786.
78 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.10 (1995).
79 See Koon, 833 F. Supp. at 785-86. Although the District Court described only
three combination factors (punishment in addition to the sentence imposed by the
court, absence of likelihood to commit future crimes, and successive state and federal
prosecutions), the Ninth Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court divided the first factor into
two: susceptibility to abuse in prison, and loss of employment.
80 Id. at 786. The approach of using a combination of factors to justify a depar-
ture was approved by the Ninth Circuit. See Koon, 34 F.3d at 1452. Although in 1994
the First, Third, and Fourth Circuits did not agree with such an approach, (see UNITED
STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 16), the Commission has since
amended the Guidelines to allow for such departures, although "the Commission be-
lieves that such cases will be extremely rare." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
app. C, amend. 508 (1995).
For the proper appellate review of this approach, see Leading Cases, 110 HARV. L.
REv. 135, 314-17 (1996) (arguing that to review a combination departure meaning-
fully, the appellate court must break down the combination and analyze each compo-
nent separately, but must also take into account the "synergy created by the interplay
of supporting factors") Id. at 316; see also Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2054 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) ("I also note that I do not understand the opinion
to foreclose the District Court from basing a downward departure on an aggregation
of factors each of which might in itself be insufficient to justify a departure.").
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tence";8' (3) the successive state and federal prosecutions "raise a
specter of unfairness";82 and (4) Koon and Powell posed low likeli-
hoods of recidivism.
83
With a new offense level of 19, the corresponding sentencing
range was 30-to-37 months, and Koon and Powell were ultimately sen-
tenced at the low end of 30 months; less than half of what the
sentences would have been before the downward departures. The
government appealed the departure decision and resulting lenient
sentence.
B. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit briefly described its reviewing role
of the District Court's decision to depart from the Guideline range.
In a single sentence, the court stated that "[w]e review de novo
whether the district court had authority to depart,"84 citing Ninth Cir-
cuit precedent.85 That precedent outlined three steps of the review
process identical to those enumerated in United States v. Diaz-Vil-
lafane.86 Although reviewing whether the district court had the "au-
thority to depart" could involve questions of the existence of
circumstances and the reasonableness of the direction and degree of
departure, the court chose a single de novo review standard. Presum-
ably, the circuit court viewed its role only as reviewing whether the
circumstances present in this case were of a kind or degree that appro-
priately justified the departures.
Using this de novo standard of review, the Ninth Circuit reversed
all of the District Court's departure decisions. The court held that the
five-level departure based upon provocation by the victim was in error
because the victim's misconduct, although an encouraged departure
factor under the Guidelines,8 7 did notjustify departure in this case for
two reasons. First, the court did not agree with the sentencing judge
that the victim's wrongful conduct contributed to provoking the crim-
inal behavior. In the Ninth Circuit's view, the criminal conduct began
81 Koon, 833 F. Supp. at 789.
82 Id. at 790.
83 See id. at 789-90.
84 Koon, 34 F.3d at 1451.
85 See United States v. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745, 746 (9th Cir. 1991).
86 874 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1989); see supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
87 See U.S. SENTENCiNG GUIDELINES MAujAL § 5K2.10, p.s. (1995). In relevant
part, this section provides: "If the victim's wrongful conduct contributed significantly
to provoking the offense behavior, the court may reduce the sentence below the
guideline range .... "
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when King was no longer persisting in his misconduct. Therefore, he
was not "provoking the offense behavior" any longer.88
Second, even if the victim's behavior did provoke the assault, the
Circuit Court believed the relevant Guideline section already took
that factor into account. The District Court and Ninth Circuit dis-
agreed about which Guideline section to use for determining the
heartland: that covering 18 U.S.C. § 242, violations of civil rights
under color of law, section 2H1.4; or the section covering the underly-
ing behavior used to calculate the total offense level-aggravated as-
sault, found in section 2A2.2. In the District Court's view, the proper
measuring standard was whether "Mr. King's wrongdoing and the sub-
stantial role it played in bringing about the defendants' unlawful con-
duct remove this case from the heartland of offenses contemplated by
the aggravated assault Guideline."8 9 In the Ninth Circuit's view, how-
ever, the case did not fall outside the heartland of cases of excessive
force by police officers, with the standard being Guideline section
2H1.4. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the case was not taken out
of the heartland because "provocation by the victim in a situation
where an officer must act instantly is typical-not unusual."90
The Ninth Circuit also rejected each of the four factors used for
the three-level downward departure. To justify the first factor, possi-
bility of abuse in prison, the district court relied upon the two Second
Circuit cases, United States v. Lara and United States v. Gonzales,9' as evi-
dence that extreme vulnerability to prison abuse is a valid factor for
downward departure. The Ninth Circuit refused to extend those cases
to the present situation, however, because in contrast to departures
based upon an "extraordinary physical impairment," Koon's and Pow-
ell's vulnerability "rests solely on their status as police officers and on
the public outrage that their crime engendered."92 Departures based
on an individual's occupation or his notoriety are "open-ended" and
"[n] othing would prevent this rationale from being applied to numer-
ous groups."93 Additionally, the court noted that it would be incon-
gruous to allow a downward departure for potential abuse in prison
88 See Koon, 34 F.3d at 1458-59.
89 Koon v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 769, 787 (C.D. Cal. 1993), afl'd in part,
vacated in part, 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 116 S. Ct. 2035
(1996).
90 Koon, 34 F.3d at 1459.
91 905 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1990); 945 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1991); see supra text accom-
panying notes 59-61.
92 Koon, 34 F.3d at 1455.
93 Id.
1698 [VOL. 72:5
COMMENT-Koon v. United States
due to the high profile of the case when "[a ] n y public outrage was the
direct result of appellants' criminal acts."'94
The second factor relied upon by the district court, disqualifica-
tion from future employment, also was not an appropriate ground for
departing because that factor is "not tied to any penological purpose
or legitimate sentencing concern expressed in the federal sentencing
statutes."95 The possibility of disqualification from future employ-
ment, or other adverse consequences of criminal convictions, are also
too common to take the case outside the heartland.96 Therefore, the
Sentencing Commission must have taken that factor into
consideration.
The unusual circumstance of successive state and federal prosecu-
tions also did notjustify departure because, again, it speaks nothing of
"the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the offense, or to
some other legitimate sentencing concern." 97 To the contrary, the
Ninth Circuit opined, the fact that the Attorney General has authority
to "undertake a successive prosecution only when [it is determined
that] the earlier state prosecution did not vindicate 'compelling
[f] ederal interests,' "98 indicates that vindication of distinct federal in-
terests was mandated in this case. 99 A downward departure here
would again be incongruous with the court's requirement to impose a
sentence that reflects the seriousness of the offense. 100
Finally, the low likelihood of recidivism was rejected as an appro-
priate departure factor because the Sentencing Guidelines clearly
state that
[t] he lower limit of the range for Criminal History Category I is set
for a first offender with the lowest risk of recidivism. Therefore, a
departure below the lower limit of the guideline range for Criminal
History Category I on the basis of the adequacy of criminal history
cannot be appropriate.' 0 '
94 Id. at 1456.
95 Id at 1454.
96 See id. ("[T]he societal consequences that flow from a criminal conviction are
virtually unlimited.").
97 Id.




101 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANjAL § 4A1.3 (1995).
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The Ninth Circuit concluded, "[t]hus, the Commission has ex-
pressly disapproved of sentencing courts' departing below the range
for the category that already reflects the lowest risk."10 2
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court set out to advance the
analysis of departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The
Court would decide the amount of deference due to sentencing
courts in their decisions to treat some criminals different from the
majority. And in the end, the Court would decide if the extraordinary
circumstances surrounding this case justified more lenient
punishments.
C. The United States Supreme Court's Decision in Koon v. United States
1. The Appellate Court's Standard of Review
The Supreme Court unanimously concluded that appellate
courts should review Sentencing Guideline departures under an abuse
of discretion standard rather than de novo. The government, which
was able to appeal the downward departure under the Guidelines, ad-
vocated the de novo review undertaken by the Ninth Circuit, arguing
that such a review was necessary to protect against unwarranted sen-
tencing disparities. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, agreed
that Congress, in allowing for greater appellate review of sentencing
determinations, "was concerned about sentencing disparities, but we
are just as convinced that Congress did not intend... to vest in appel-
late courts wide-ranging authority over district court sentencing deci-
sions."' 03 The Court also pointed out that Congress, in enacting 18
U.S.C. § 3742, required that courts of appeals "give due deference to
the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts." 104 In
conclusion, "[a] district court's decision to depart from the Guide-
lines.., will in most cases be due substantial deference, for it embod-
ies the traditional exercise of discretion by a sentencing court."10 5
The district courts "have an institutional advantage" over appellate
courts in making departure determinations.
10 6
102 Koon, 34 F.3d at 1457.
103 Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2046 (1996).
104 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (4) (1994).
105 Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2046.
106 See id. at 2047. Interestingly, the Court noted that determining whether a
given case is unusual enough for it to fall outside the heartland of cases are "matters
determined in large part by comparison with the facts of other Guideline cases." Id.
But neither the district court, the Ninth Circuit, or the Supreme Court performed
such a task. This omission is criticized in Alexa P. Freeman, Unscheduled Departures:
The Circumvention ofJust Sentencingfor Police Brutality, 47 HAsTINns L.J. 677, 765 (1996)
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By setting forth an abuse of discretion standard, the Court col-
lapsed all three parts of the tripartite test previously used by the courts
of appeals into one single review standard. 10 7 This simplifies matters
and focuses the appellate court on its appropriate task. The relevant
question on review is not "whether a particular factor is within the
'heartland' as a general proposition, .. . but whether the particular
factor is within the heartland given all the facts of the case."' 08 This,
of course, does not mean that an appellate court will not encounter
questions of law when reviewing departures. In the words of the
Court:
[The abuse of discretion standard] does not mean that district
courts do not confront questions of law in deciding whether to de-
part. In the present case, for example, the Government argues that
the District Court relied on factors that may not be considered in
any case. The Government is quite correct that whether a factor is a
permissible basis for departure under any circumstances is a ques-
tion of law, and the court of appeals need not defer to the district
court's resolution of the point. Little turns, however, on whether
we label review of this particular question abuse of discretion or de
novo, for an abuse of discretion standard does not mean a mistake
of law is beyond appellate correction. A district court by definition
abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law. That a depar-
ture decision, in an occasional case, may call for a legal determina-
tion does not mean, as a consequence, that parts of the review must
be labeled de novo while other parts are labeled an abuse of discre-
tion. The abuse of discretion standard includes review to determine
(arguing that since the Sentencing Commission's intentions are unclear concerning
most factors, the Supreme Court should have remanded the case to the trial court to
make explicit findings as to whether the factors were in fact inside or outside the
heartland by comparing the present case with other police brutality cases).
107 The Supreme Court similarly collapsed multipart tests, involving questions of
law and fact, into single abuse of discretion standards in Cooter & Cell v. Hartmarx
Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990) (review of Rule 11 sanctions) and Pierce v. Underwood, 487
U.S. 552 (1988) (district court's determinations under Equal Access to justice Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d)). In those cases, as here, the district court is owed deference be-
cause it is "'better positioned than another to decide the issue in question."' Koon,
116 S. Ct. at 2047 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)). However, the
Supreme Court, when faced with mixed questions of law and fact, has not always used
a single abuse of discretion standard. See Leading Cases, supra note 80, at 317-27.
108 Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2047 ("For example, it does not advance the analysis much
to determine that a victim's misconduct might justify a departure in some aggravated
assault cases. What the district court must determine is whether the misconduct
which occurred in the particular instance suffices to make the case atypical."); see also
id. at 2050-51 ("Congress did not grant federal courts authority to decide what sorts
of sentencing considerations are inappropriate in every circumstance."); supra text
accompanying note 62.
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that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal
conclusions.
1 0 9
This Supreme Court explanation of the new standard leaves
room for different interpretations, and Part V of this Comment will
show that some circuit courts have taken advantage of this. But most
circuit courts have held closely to the reasoning of this passage. The
"occasional" legal determinations that an appellate court must make
include determinations of whether the district court used factors
which are expressly forbidden by the Guidelines, or whether the dis-
trict court has misinterpreted a set of words given in the Guidelines or
the statutes relevant to the Guidelines. Such an interpretation of this
passage has support from the Rivera decision, described previously in
this Comment, that the Supreme Court, for the most part, agreed
with. 1 0
2. Downward Departure Factors
The Court next reviewed the District Court's downward depar-
ture decisions using the abuse of discretion standard. Although four
Justices dissented to different parts of the majority's conclusions in
this area, these dissents probably did not arise out of a failure to use
the new standard of review but rather out of a lack of guidance by
Congress or the Sentencing Commission concerning when departures
are appropriate.
a. Five-level Departure Due to Victim Misconduct
The Court unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit, upholding
the District Court's decision to depart downward because King's
"wrongful conduct contributed significantly to provoking the offense
behavior.""' Victim misconduct is an encouraged departure factor,
and therefore the district court is authorized to depart if the applica-
ble Guideline does not already take that factor into account. Because
the applicable Guideline for violating 18 U.S.C. § 242 is unusual in
that it applies to multiple types of behavior, the relevant heartland is
difficult to pinpoint.112 The underlying offense in this case was aggra-
vated assault, and the Court agreed with the District Court that the
109 Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2047-48 (citations omitted).
110 See United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 951 (1st Cir. 1993).
111 Koon v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 769, 786 (C.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd in part,
vacated in par 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1994), af/'d in part, rev'd in part, 116 S. Ct. 2035
(1996).
112 This difficulty is evidenced by the District and Circuit Court's struggle with
finding the relevant heartland. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
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applicable heartland is not police officer excessive force cases, but ag-
gravated assault committed under color of law cases. The Guideline
range therefore "applies both to a Government official who assaults a
citizen without provocation as well as instances like this where what
begins as legitimate force becomes excessive."" 3 The Court con-
cluded that the District Court "did not abuse its discretion in differen-
tiating between the classes of cases, nor did it do so in concluding that
unprovoked assaults constitute the relevant heartland."1 4
The Court also agreed with the District Court that, in this case,
the victim provoked the criminal conduct of Koon and Powell. "A
finding that King's misconduct provoked lawful force but not the un-
lawful force that followed without interruption would be a startling
interpretation and contrary to ordinary understandings of provoca-
tion." 15 Therefore, the District Court was justified in finding the cir-
cumstances of this provoked assault atypical, warranting a downward
departure.1 6
b. Three-level Departure Based on a Combination of Factors
Addressing the first of the combination factors, eight of the nine
Justices agreed that the District Court abused its discretion in relying
on the defendant's disqualification from future employment as a de-
parture factor. "[I]t is not unusual for a public official who is con-
victed of using his governmental authority to violate a person's rights
to lose his or her job and to be barred from future work in that
field.""17 Therefore, basing a departure upon job loss in this case is
inappropriate because the factor does not take the case outside of the
heartland. Justice Stevens dissented from this conclusion, simply stat-
ing that "the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it relied
113 Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2050.
114 Id. (emphasis added).
115 Id. at 2049.
116 For a broader view of this holding and its implications, see Freeman, supra note
105, at 680-83, 751-65:
The Supreme Court's reversal of the Ninth Circuit is troubling not only be-
cause of the symbolic weight that the 'Rodney King case' carries, but also
because the decision paves the way for downward departures from the sen-
tencing guidelines in future police brutality cases.... Now the Sentencing
Commission must act again, this time to ensure that just sentencing for po-
lice brutality is not circumvented by the Supreme Court's ruling. It must
promptly amend the guidelines to make clear that the departure grounds
approved in Koon are not normally applicable in police brutality cases.
Id. at 683.
117 Koo7 116 S. Ct. at 2052.
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on the unusual collateral employment consequences faced by these
petitioners as a result of their convictions."' " 8
Second, the Court unanimously agreed with the Ninth Circuit
that the defendants' low likelihood of recidivism was not an appropri-
ate basis for departure because there is evidence that the Commission
took that factor into account when formulating the criminal history
categories. Specifically, the Commission expressly stated that "[t]he
lower limit of the range for Criminal History Category I is set for a first
offender with the lowest risk of recidivism. Therefore, a departure
below the lower limit of the guideline range for Criminal History Cat-
egory I... cannot be appropriate."119
Only six of the nine Justices agreed with the District Court on the
use of the remaining two factors. The circumstance of potential for
abuse in prison is not mentioned in the Guidelines; therefore, the
sentencing judge must determine whether the circumstances of the
case take it outside of the heartland of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 242,
keeping in mind the structure and theory of both the particular
Guideline section corresponding to this statute as well as the Guide-
lines as a whole. The majority held that because of the widespread
publicity and emotional outrage surrounding this case, the District
Court's finding that Koon and Powell were particularly likely to be
targets of abuse in prison, making this case unusual or outside of the
heartland of cases "is just the sort of determination that must be ac-
corded deference by the appellate courts."' 20
The last of the four factors, successive state and federal prosecu-
tions, was properly considered by the District Court for departure pur-
poses. The Court stated that "[t] he state trial was lengthy, and the toll
it took is not beyond the cognizance of the District Court."' 2 ' The
Courtjustified the departure because it significantly burdened the de-
fendants, presumably beyond the burden to defendants in the heart-
land of cases.
122
118 Id. at 2054 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
119 Id. at 2052-53 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.3 (1992)).
120 Id. at 2053.
121 Id.
122 The Court did not mention any type of heartland analysis, including whether
the factor made the case unusual or whether the Commission already took the factor
into consideration. Therefore, it is presumed that the Court found that the District
Court did not abuse its discretion in finding the extent of burden upon the defend-
ants in this case "atypical."
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In conclusion, because the District Court based its departure on
both permissible and impermissible factors, the Court remanded the
case to the District Court for resentencing.
123
c. Dissenting Opinions
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented in part, find-
ing that the Court's acceptance of the last two factors, susceptibility to
abuse in prison and successive state and federal prosecutions, "attri-
bute[s] an element of irrationality to the Commission and to its
'heartland' concept."124 In Justice Souter's opinion, departures may
only be based upon the existence of unusual factual circumstances
which should result in a different sentence. "Departures ... must be
consistent with rational normative order."' 25 These sentiments resem-
ble the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the District Court's results
were "incongruous" with sentencing goals.' 2
6
The District Court's reliance upon the defendant's susceptibility
to abuse in prison was in error because the publicity "stemmed from
the remarkable brutality of petitioners' proven behavior."' 27 Allowing
a downward departure on this basis would result in reverse logic; in
this situation, the more serious the crime and widespread the publicity
because of the seriousness of the crime, the less one would be pun-
ished. Justice Souter also pointed out that the Commission discour-
aged downward departures for susceptibility to prison abuse even
when due to unusual physical appearance. 28 Therefore, rewarding
the offender based upon his own acts "could hardly have been in the
contemplation of [the] Commission."' 29
Justice Souter also disagreed with the majority that the successive
prosecutions warranted a downward departure. Because the federal
court used the same evidence as the state court to prove their case, he
concluded that the state court system clearly malfunctioned since the
state trial did not result in a conviction although the federal trial did.
For the defendants to obtain a lighter sentence because of this occur-
123 On remand, U.S. DistrictJudgeJohn Davies declined to impose additional im-
prisonment on Koon and Powell because, in his opinion, the factors upheld by the
Supreme Court warranted the same sentence. See No More Prison in King Beating,
WASH. PosT, Sept. 27, 1996, at A2.
124 Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2054 (SouterJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
125 Id.
126 See United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1456 (9th Cir. 1994), affd in part, rev'd
in part 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996).
127 Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2054 (SouterJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
128 See U.S. SENTENCING GumDEuLwm MANuAL § 5H1.4 (1995).
129 Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2055 (SouterJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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rence "would again attribute a normative irrationality to the heartland
concept."' 30 This would reward the defendants for a malfunction in
the state system, which has nothing to do with penological purposes
or sentencing goals. Justice Souter acknowledged that successive fed-
eral prosecutions after state proceedings occur very rarely, but the fac-
tor should not always be subject to discretion to depart downward
given the "normative ordering" of whether a court should take it into
account.13
1
Justice Breyer, also joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented in part
as well, arguing that Congress intended, when enacting 18 U.S.C.
§ 242, to provide a federal forum for cases when state prosecutions
have failed. And because the Commission "'examined the many hun-
dreds of criminal statutes in the United States Code,' . . . it would
likely have been aware of this well-known legislative purpose."1
32
Therefore, the Commission must have taken the factor of potential
double prosecution, although rare, into account when formulating
the corresponding Guideline section.
Justice Breyer also concluded that the District Court abused its
discretion in using the defendants' potential for prison abuse as a de-
parture factor.
I believe that the Guidelines themselves embody an awareness of
potentially harsh (or lenient) treatment in prison, thereby permit-
ting departure on that basis only in a truly unusual case. Even af-
fording the District Court "due deference," I cannot find in this
record anything sufficiently unusual, compared, say, with other po-
licemen imprisoned for civil rights violations, as to justify
departure.'
33
130 Id. at 2056.
131 See id. at 2055-56.
132 Id. at 2056 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, cmt. 5 (1995)). This reasoning is criti-
cized in Kate Stith, The Hegemony of the Sentencing Commission, 9 FED. SENTENCING REP.
14, 16 (1996). Her argument is thatJustice Breyer did not use the stated language of
18 U.S.C. § 3553 in his analysis. That statute provides that, when deciding whether
the Commission adequately considered a given circumstance, the court shall consider
"only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the
Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994). She argued thatJustice Breyer
did not base his conclusions on this information, but knew about the Commission's
thinking only because he was a member of the Sentencing Commission when it
promulgated the civil rights guidelines. In addition, "It]he real question is not
whether the Commission actually took some factor into account, but rather, whether
the factor is rare enough to overcome the presumption that the Commission took it
into account." Stith, supra at 16.
133 Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2056 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citation omitted). This analysis seems to ignore the fact that the Koon case is ex-
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V. CASES FOLLOWING THE SUPREME COURT'S Koov DECISION
A. Applications of the Standard of Review
Many Federal Circuits appear to be accurately applying the abuse
of discretion standard for Sentencing Guideline departures set forth
in Koon v. United States.'34 Because the First Circuit's Rivera case was,
for the most part, accepted by the Supreme Court, it is not surprising
to find that another First Circuit case, United States v. Olbres,135 ex-
plains the Koon decision well. In that case, the defendants, convicted
of tax evasion, appealed a denial of a downward departure. The court
followed the structure of analysis set forth in Koon and initially re-
jected the trial court's categorical approach of proclaiming job loss
due to business failure inappropriate for departure in all cases. Then
the court went on to explain Koon's standard of review:
Koon, we believe, reinforces this Circuit's view that "[p]lenary
review is appropriate where the question in review is simply whether
the allegedly special circumstances . . . are of the 'kind' that the
Guidelines, in principle, permit the sentencing court to consider at
all." This is so because the court, "in deciding whether the allegedly
special circumstances are of a 'kind' that permits departure, will
have to perform the 'quintessentially legal' function of interpreting
a set of words... in light of their intention or purpose. 136
Beyond that legal question, the Olbres case implies that any additional
review of a departure decision should give the sentencing judge sub-
stantial deference, including the determination of whether the cir-
tremely unusual, given the notoriety of the Rodney King beating caught on videotape
and the Los Angeles riots that followed the state court acquittal. Justice Souter's argu-
ment on "normative ordering" is more persuasive on this point.
134 See, e.g., United States v. Olbres, 99 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v.
Hardy, 99 F.3d 1242 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Delmarle, 99 F.3d 80 (2d Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1097 (1997); United States v. Withers, 100 F.3d 1142 (4th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1282 (1997); United States v. Hairston, 96 F.3d 102
(4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 956 (1997); United States v. Wells, 101 F.3d 370
(5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Barajas-Nunez, 91 F.3d 826 (6th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Pullen, 89 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 706 (1997); United
States v. Charry Cubillos, 91 F.3d 1342 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Beasley, 90
F.3d 400 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 533 (1996); United States v. Sablan, 90
F.3d 362 (9th Cir. 1996), rehg en bane granted, 101 F.3d 618 (9th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Taylor, 88 F.3d 938 (11th Cir. 1996).
135 99 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 1996).
136 Id. at 35 (quoting United States v. Rivera. 994 F.2d 942, 951 (1st Cir. 1993))
(emphasis added).
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cumstances, as they exist in the case, are unusual enough to cause the
case to fall outside of the heartland.
3 7
Other circuit courts have attempted to apply the Koon decision
with some difficulty, however. For example, in United States v. Wein-
berger,138 the Fourth Circuit reversed a downward departure based
upon extraordinary forfeiture, an unmentioned departure factor.
1 39
Although the court's conclusion was probably correct, most of its anal-
ysis conflicts with Koon. First, the court concluded that extraordinary
forfeiture could never be used as a departure factor because the Com-
mission considered forfeiture as a part of the heartland of cases as
evidenced by section 5E1.4 of the Guidelines, which provides: "'For-
feiture is to be imposed upon a convicted defendant as provided by
statute."',140 The court did not address the perceived extraordinary for-
feiture in the case however. As Koon stated, "Congress did not grant
federal courts authority to decide what sorts of sentencing considera-
tions are inappropriate in every circumstance." 14 1 Evidence existed
that the Commission had considered forfeiture in formulating the
Guidelines, but that does not mean that extraordinary forfeiture, in a
given case, might not warrant a downward departure. 142
Second, the court reviewed the downward departure using a de
novo standard, framing the review of the departure as a legal ques-
tion: "The court's action was an error of law and 'by definition' was an
abuse of discretion."'143 This conclusion misinterprets the Supreme
Court's Koon decision. Koon stated that there may be questions of law
upon appellate review of a departure decision, but as an example the
Court stated that "whether a factor is a permissible basis for departure
under any circumstances is a question of law, and the court of appeals
need not defer to the district court's resolution of the point."'144 That
137 See id. at 37. The court ultimately remanded the case for further findings of
fact. See id. at 38.
138 91 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1996).
139 The Government received $600,000 in a forfeiture action where the plea agree-
ment set the restitution amount at $545,000. The trial court characterized this as an
"extraordinary forfeiture." See id. at 643.
140 Id. at 644 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5E1.4 (1995)).
141 Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2050 (1996).
142 For a different interpretation of whether Koon requires a discretionary stan-
dard in deciding whether the Sentencing Commission has taken a factor into ac-
count, see Stith, supra note 132, at 14 ("Koon gave deference to the sentencing court
only on the question of which factors are present in the case at hand, not on the
question whether the Commission had already taken that factor adequately into ac-
count .. ").
143 Weinberger, 91 F.3d at 645 (citing Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2046-48).
144 Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2047 (emphasis added).
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question, referring to forbidden factors, is quite different from the
question of whether a given circumstance, as it exists in the case at
hand, warrants departure-a question which demands deference
under Koon.
The same circuit, in deciding a case which had been before the
Supreme Court at the same time as Koon v. United States, but had been
remanded for further consideration in light of the Koon decision, very
clearly misapplied the Supreme Court's instructions. In United States
v. Rybicki,' 45 the Fourth Circuit reversed a district court's decision to
depart downwards five levels based upon a combination of factors. In
reviewing the departure decision, the court reverted back to a multi-
part test-a difficult analysis to consistently apply which Koon clearly
attempted to rectify by setting forth a single abuse of discretion stan-
dard. The court in Rybicki explained their five-part analysis:146
First, the factual determinations of the circumstances and conse-
quences of the offense are reviewed for clear error.
Second, the determination that the circumstances are "atypical"
and therefore potentially take the case outside of the applicable heart-
land is never subject to appellate review because of the district court's
"experience in criminal sentencing."' 47
Third, whether the factor is "forbidden," "encouraged," "discour-
aged," or "unmentioned" is a question of law reviewed de novo.
Fourth, the determination that an "encouraged" factor has al-
ready been adequately taken into account by the Guidelines, or
whether a "discouraged" factor is present to an exceptional degree, or
whether an unmentioned factor justifies departure based on the struc-
ture and theory of the Guidelines, are all legal questions subject to de
novo review. 148
Fifth, "whether circumstances and consequences appropriately
classified and considered take the case out of the applicable guide-
line's heartland and whether a departure from the guideline's speci-
fied sentencing range is therefore warranted" is subject to an abuse of
discretion review. 149
Using this multi-part analysis, the court easily reversed the five-
level departure. Little difference can be found between the analysis of
steps four and five. Perhaps the court was only distinguishing step five
on the basis of whether the departure was warranted, leaving only that
145 96 F.3d 754 (4th Cir. 1996).
146 See id. at 757-58.
147 Id. at 757.
148 See id. at 758.
149 Id.
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determination to the discretion of the sentencing court. The court
also seemed to be separating two questions which Koon expressly
stated should be analyzed as one: "The relevant question [on appeal]
is not... whether a particular factor is within the 'heartland' as a
general proposition, but whether the particular factor is within the
heartland given all the facts of the case.... [And] [t]hese considera-
tions are factual matters."150
B. Other Departure Issues Which Koon Does Not Resolve
One main area of Sentencing Guideline departure jurisprudence
left open by Koon is the appropriate review of the extent of departure.
According to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (f) (2), if the appellate court determines
the sentence "is outside the applicable guideline range and is unrea-
sonable," the court shall set aside the sentence and remand the case.
Both district and appellate courts commonly determine and re-
view the extent of departure by analogizing the unusual circumstances
to other parts of the Guidelines.151 For example, the Seventh Circuit
in United States v. Horton'52 described the review of extent of departure
as follows: "Although we have recognized the impossibility of formu-
lating precise rules for determining whether the extent of an upward
departure is reasonable.., this court and others have approved of a
method that involves calculating the defendant's sentence by analogy
to existing guideline provisions."' 53 Further,
[w]e do not read Koon to require that we abdicate our reviewing
authority over the magnitude of a departure chosen by the district
court.... Although Koon changed the standard of review with re-
spect to [whether to depart].... we do not believe that it subverted
our rationale for requiring a district court to explain its reasons for
assigning a departure of a particular magnitude in a manner that is
susceptible to rational review.
154
150 Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2047. Interestingly, another Fourth Circuit case, United
States v. Hairston, 96 F.3d 102 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 956 (1997), which
was decided 10 days before Rybick 96 F.3d 754, accurately followed Koon's single
abuse of discretion standard of review.
151 See, e.g., United States v. Hardy, 99 F.3d 1242 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v.
Horton, 98 F.3d 313 (7th Cir. 1996).
152 98 F.3d 313 (7th Cir. 1996).
153 Id. at 317; see also Hardy, 99 F.3d at 1253; United States v. Sablan, 90 F.3d 362,
364-65 (9th Cir. 1996), reh'g en banc granted, 101 F.3d 618 (9th Cir. 1996).
154 Horton, 98 F.3d at 319.
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Ultimately, the court remanded the case because the district
court did not choose an appropriate analogy for determining the ex-
tent of an upward departure. 155
In contrast to most circuits, the Eighth Circuit, in United States v.
McCarthy,'56 refuses to review the extent of departure, "'regardless of
the district court's reasons for refraining from departing further.'"157
In that case, the defendant, convicted of money laundering and con-
spiracy to distribute marijuana, appealed the extent of departure the
district court made in favor of the defendant as not being great
enough.'5 8 The district court departed downward from a sentencing
range of 210-to-262 months imprisonment to a final sentence of 156
months, based upon substantial assistance to the government and a
request to depart below the statutory mandatory minimum.' 59 The
defendant asserted that the district court relied on improper factors
in determining the extent of departure. The appellate court refused
to review the district court's reasons for departure: "In this circuit, the
extent of a district court's downward departure is not reviewable."'
60
The court would not examine the factors listed by the district court
justifying departure and the weight it gave to each factor. In conclu-
sion, "[a]ll the statute and the Guidelines require is that the reasons
for the departure be stated.' 6' This statement ignores the fact that
an appellate court must use the reasoning of the sentencing court in
order to determine whether the extent of departure is
"unreasonable."1 62
155 The district court departed upward eight levels in the case of a bomb threat
pursuant to U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.7 (1995), because the "de-
fendant's conduct significantly disrupted a governmental function ...." Horton, 98
F.3d at 318. The sentencing judge erroneously justified the extent of departure by
analogizing to U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A6.1 (b) (1) (1995), which is
reserved for defendants whose conduct evidences an intent to carry out the threat.
Horton's conduct did not. See Horton, 98 F.3d at 318.
156 97 F.3d 1562 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1011 (1997), 117 S. Ct. 1284
(1997).
157 Id. at 1577 (quoting United States v. Dutcher, 8 F.3d 11, 12 (8th Cir. 1993)).
158 Note that this appeal is not allowed by 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1994), because a
defendant can only appeal a sentence which "is greater than the sentence specified in
the applicable guideline range .... " 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (emphasis added).
159 See McCarthy, 97 F.3d at 1577.
160 Id. (emphasis added).
161 Id. (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 5Kl.1(a) (1995).
162 See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 80 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. 3182, 3263
("The statement of reasons for a sentence outside the guidelines is especially impor-
tant.... The statement of reasons will play an important role in the evaluation of the
reasonableness of the sentence.").
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Another split between the circuit courts lies in the question of
whether a decision not to depart from the Guidelines should be re-
viewed by an appellate court.1 63 This question was not before the
Court in Koon, but criminal defendants have attempted to use the de-
cision to require appellate courts to review such a sentence
determination.
It appears that Congress, in enacting the SRA, did not intend for
appellate courts to review decisions not to depart from the Guidelines:
Appellate courts have long followed the principle that sentences im-
posed by district courts within legal limits should not be dis-
turbed .... Section 3742 accommodates [departure] considerations
by... confining [appellate review of sentences] to cases in which
the sentences are illegal, are imposed as the result of an incorrect
application of the sentencing guidelines, or are outside the range
specified in the guidelines and unreasonable .... [These] limita-
tions imposed . .. are further restrictions on the use of appellate
review of sentences in order to avoid unnecessary appeals.
164
In accordance with this congressional intent, the Second Circuit,
in United States v. Brown,'65 declined to extend Koon to decisions not to
depart from the Guidelines. The Second Circuit had observed in the
infancy of the Guidelines that:
Congress's failure to provide appellate review of sentences within
the Guidelines correctly calculated [sentencing range] was . . .a
conscious decision consistent with its overall purpose. The very na-
ture of the sentencing reform enterprise was to establish national
standards narrowing the discretion of sentencing judges as to attain
a degree of uniformity .... 166
The court held that "[t] hese principles were in no way affected by
the Court's decision in Koon."
167
163 Compare United States v. Brown, 98 F.3d 690 (2d Cir. 1996), and McCarthy, 97
F.3d 1562 (declining to review decisions not to depart), with United States v. Hardy,
99 F.3d 1242 (1st Cir. 1996), United States v. Lewis, 90 F.3d 302 (8th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 713 (1997), United States v. Edwards, 98 F.3d 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, No. 96-1492, 1997 WL 134423 (U.S., Apr. 14, 1997), and United States v.
Olbres, 99 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 1996) (reviewing decisions not to depart).
164 S. REP. No. 98-225, at 150, 154 (1993), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. 3182,
3333, 3337; see also Selya & Kipp, supra note 10, at 13-15, 14 n.62. "Congress did not
intend to impinge on what remains of the district court's discretion by providing for
review of sentences imposed within the proper guideline range." Id. at 14.
165 98 F.3d 690 (2d Cir. 1996).
166 Id. at 692 (quoting United States v. Colon, 884 F.2d 1550, 1555 (2d Cir. 1989)).
167 Id.
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A compelling argument exists, however, for the review of deci-
sions not to depart from the Guidelines in United States v. Olbres.168
The First Circuit, in that case, reviewed a district court's refusal to
depart from the Guidelines based upon termination of an ongoing
business enterprise and innocent persons' loss of employment as a
result of the defendants' convictions. The district court decided that
case precedent mandated that "as a matter of law, business failure and
third party job loss, regardless of the magnitude or severity of the con-
sequences, could not serve as the basis for a downward departure mo-
tion. 1 69 The First Circuit cited Koon many times in the opinion, and
concluded that categorical refusal to use the factors of job loss from
business failures "would run afoul of one of the important concerns
articulated in Koon. The Supreme Court has held that generally
courts should not categorically reject a factor as a basis for departure
from [the] Guidelines .... "170 The First Circuit correctly interprets
Koon, although Koon did not address the issue of a district court's cate-
gorical approach to departure factors. In Koon, the circuit court had
incorrectly used that approach. Perhaps if such a review were not
characterized as a review of a sentence outside the Guideline range,
but rather as an "incorrect application of the sentencing guide-
lines,"' 71 this would be allowed under 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
Finally, does Koon apply to adjustment decisions (guided depar-
tures) as well as unguided departures? Some circuits continue to re-
view such adjustments using the de novo standard they used before
the Koon decision, reasoning that appellate review of guided depar-
tures involves interpreting a statute. 72 The Eighth Circuit, however,
in United States v. McCarthy,'73 used Koon's abuse of discretion standard
to review whether a two- or four-level adjustment was warranted in
168 99 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 1996).
169 Id. at 33.
170 Id. at 34.
171 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (2) (1994).
172 See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 88 F.3d 938, 942 (11th Cir. 1996) ("In the
context of applying enhancements pursuant to specific offense characteristics and for
obstruction ofjustice, this Court has held that our scope of review is de novo.... We
review a district court's departure from the applicable sentencing guideline range for
abuse of discretion." (emphasis added)).
173 97 F.3d 1562 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1011 (1997), 117 S. Ct. 1284
(1997); see also United States v. Edwards, 98 F.3d 1364, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (using a
due deference standard, and citing Koon as authority, for the review of a district
court's failure to apply a two-level adjustment), cert. denied, No. 96-1492, 1997 WL
134423 (U.S., Apr. 14, 1997).
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that case, citing Koon as authority.174 Although not addressed by Koon,
the reasoning behind an abuse of discretion standard-that sentenc-
ing judges have a better "feel" for the case and ability to apply the facts
of the case to the Guidelines' instructions-would perhaps justify a
similar standard of review for adjustment decisions.' 75 In addition,
guided departures are similar to unguided departures in that the pro-
cess involves both questions of law and questions of fact. That is, the
process involves interpreting the Guidelines as well as deciding
whether the particular circumstances of the case cause it to fall within
the guided departure criteria.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND A PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. Appellate Review of Departure Decisions
The Koon decision, by adopting an abuse of discretion standard,
addresses and properly modifies the appropriate roles which the dis-
trict and circuit courts should play in departures from the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. 176 Under the previous de novo review, the ap-
pellate courts were permitted to decide not only the scope of cases
which constitute the heartland of a particular Guideline section, but
also whether the facts of a case cause it to fall within or outside of that
heartland. Neither determination is appropriate for the circuit
courts.
First, as the Supreme Court noted, the district court, because of
its unique vantage point and day-to-day experience in criminal sen-
tencing, has an institutional advantage over circuit courts in making
both of these determinations. 177 The district courts view many more
Guideline cases than circuit courts, and the district courts also see
first-hand the circumstances of the specific case and specific offender
characteristics. Their ability to compare the two cannot be replaced
or matched by a higher court. Deference to their discretionary deci-
sions is therefore logical and appropriate.
174 Id. at 1579 (citing Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2046-48). None of these pages mention
sentencing adjustments; they only mention the unguided departures which were
before the Court.
175 An argument could be made that adjustment decisions should not be review-
able at all because they fall within the legal limits of the guideline range. However,
some limited appellate review would probably be helpful to maintain the goals of
reduced disparity and uniformity.
176 This conclusion has support in Abraham L. Clott, An Assistant Federal Defender
Responds to Koon, 9 FED. SENTENCING REP. 25, 27 (1996) ("If Koon is taken seriously,
sentencing responsibility is shifted even further from the courts of appeals to both the
district courts and the Commission.").
177 See Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2047.
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Second, Congress, in contrast with prior sentencing practice, pro-
vided for limited appellate review under the Sentencing Guidelines,
only to "assure that the guidelines are applied properly." 78 This re-
view does not contemplate the replacement of the district court
judge's "thoughtful imposition of individualized sentences," 79 but is
required only to "provid[e] adequate means for correction of errone-
ous and clearly unreasonable sentences." 8 0
Without greater scrutiny of departure decisions, many commen-
tators believe that the discretionary review adopted in Koonwill result
in more departures from the Guidelines, undermining the goal of re-
duced disparity in criminal sentences.' 81 However, Congress's goal of
reduced disparity can be fully achieved through the inherent restric-
tions in the Guidelines themselves. Under the Guidelines, district
court judges are held to narrow sentencing ranges in the typical case,
can only depart when "there exists an aggravating or mitigating cir-
cumstance not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the Guidelines," and must specifically
enumerate and justify the reasons for departures. Further, their de-
parture decisions are subject to limited appellate review, initiated by
the defendant or the government. These are radical changes from
the previous sentencing practices which resulted in great disparity in
sentences for similarly situated defendants. The constraints imposed
upon sentencing judges by such a structured sentencing scheme
should in and of themselves improve uniformity in sentencing. Fur-
ther, keeping in mind the additional goal of proportionality and fair-
178 S. REP. No. 98-225, at 151 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C-A.N. 3182, 3334.
179 Id. at 52, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3235.
180 Id. at 155, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3338; see also id. at 150, reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C..N. 3182, 3333 ("The sentencing provisions of the reported bill are
designed to preserve the concept that the discretion of a sentencing judge has a
proper place in sentencing and should not be displaced by the discretion of an appel-
late court.").
181 See, e.g., Clott, supra note 176:
Defense lawyers seeking to persuade sentencing judges that they have
broad discretion to depart below guideline sentencing ranges that appear
correctly calculated but too high will find some immediate gratification in
the Supreme Court's Koon decision .... Only the most plainly illegal depar-
tures should fail, at least under the present guidelines ....
Id. at 25; Bowman, supra note 40, at 32 ("Since Koon seems to provide courts with a
license to depart, it would not be too far fetched to believe that a departure-happy
district might seize the moment and begin an onslaught of court-initiated downward
departures."). But see Stith, supra note 132, at 15 (claiming that the significance of the
abuse of discretion standard is diminished within the Koon decision by the extent of
review the Justices undertook).
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ness, discretion should properly be given to the district courts to
depart when the individual circumstances justify a different sentence.
As long as this ability to depart conforms with the instructions for de-
parture provided in the Guidelines, unwarranted disparity should not
occur. And this is the only disparity which should be of concern.
8 2
Finally, the discretionary standard properly reflects Congress's
original intent in formulating the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
"The sentencing guidelines system will not remove all of the judge's
sentencing discretion. Instead, it will guide the judge in making his
decision on the appropriate sentence."' 8 3 The Supreme Court
echoed this intent, by stating in Koon: "Discretion is reserved within
the Sentencing Guidelines, and reflected by the standard of appellate
review we adopt."' 8
4
B. The Mechanics of Departure Decisions
Although the Supreme Court unanimously agreed on the appro-
priate appellate standard of review, the Court's disagreement over the
validity of the District Court's departure factors evidences the ambigu-
ity surrounding the proper procedures to follow for departure deci-
sions. This ambiguity leads not only to a district court's uncertainty
about when it can legally depart, but also to inconsistent appellate
review of departure decisions. Thus, the fear of potentially increased
sentence disparity caused by the more deferential review standard is
only enhanced by this ambiguity. Therefore, Congress and the Sen-
tencing Commission should amend the Guidelines to provide further
guidance on departure decisions.
The foundation for such an amendment can be found in the
Supreme Court's Koon v. United States decision itself, and the bases for
182 For a position advocating increased, but constrained, discretion to depart, see
Karen Lutjen, Article, Culpability and Sentencing Under Mandatory Minimums and the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines: The Punishment No Longer Fits the Criminal, 10 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 389, 464 (1996):
Perhaps the most important and necessary method of improving the guide-
lines is also the most obvious-return enough discretion to judges so they
may consider all relevant offender and offense characteristics. This does not
mean a return to unconstrained discretionary sentencing, where every factor
that the defendant wishes to assert in his favor must be considered. Rather,
it contemplates the consideration of factors 'not ordinarily relevant,' such as
age, family responsibilities, work experience or drug and alcohol abuse.
Id.; see also Kmiec, supra note 65, at 201 ("None of the Guidelines' critics doubt the
necessity for appropriate appellate review, but all stress the need that such review
ought not displace the need for individualized punishment.").
183 S. REP. No. 98-225, at 51 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. 3182, 3234.
184 Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2053 (1996).
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the dissenting opinions. The Koon decision, as do the Guidelines, em-
phasizes the "heartland" concept: "The Commission . .. says it has
formulated each Guideline to apply to a heartland of typical cases.
Atypical cases were not 'adequately taken into consideration .. ."'185
This explanation seemingly leads to a simple typical/atypical case
analysis. However, the heartland concept is not so simple, and even
the majority did not always follow the typical/atypical analysis in its
conclusions. In fact, the atypical, or unusual, test is only one of three
used throughout the opinion.
The majority used a second test when it concluded that the peti-
tioner's low likelihood for recidivism was an invalid departure factor.
The Court based this conclusion not upon the fact that the case was
typical, but because the Court found evidence in the Guidelines that
the Commission took the factor into account in formulating Criminal
History Category 1.186 As a third test, Justice Souter's dissent empha-
sized the "rational normative order" requirement that departures are
warranted only if the unusual circumstances should result in a differ-
ent sentence.18
7
Support for all three of these viewpoints, or tests, can be found in
the Guidelines and applicable statutes.' 8 8 Therefore, an appropriate
set of departure instructions should take all three tests into
account. 89
185 Id. at 2044 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (1995)); see
also Stith, supra note 132, at 14 ("[T]he court unanimously embraced the notion that
the sentencing guidelines deal with 'heartland' cases, and that judges may depart in
cases outside the 'heartland.'").
186 See Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2052-53.
187 See it. at 2054 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
188 First, "[t]he Commission intends the sentencing courts to treat each guideline
as carving out a 'heartland,' a set of typical cases embodying the conduct that each
guideline describes." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, cmt. 4(b)
(1995); Second, "[t]he court shall impose a sentence... within the range... unless
the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance ... not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating
the guidelines.... ." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994); Third, "[t]he court shall impose a
sentence ... within the range .. .unless the court finds [a factor] not adequately
taken into consideration [and the factor] should result in a sentence different from
that described." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994) (emphasis added). See also PaulJ. Hofer,
Discretion to Depait After Koon v. United States, 9 FED. SENTENCING REP. 8 (1996)
(describing the three potentially different heartland concepts as "statistical, inten-
tional, and normative").
189 In contrast, the First Circuit, in United States v. Rivera, chose to interpret the
apparent conflict between the different departure instruction languages by stating:
[W]e believe the statutory language "adequately taken into consideration"
sometimes has little practical importance .... The Commission itself has
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C. Proposed Departure Test
This Comment recommends continued adherence to then-Chief
Judge Breyer's analysis set forth in Rivera, as the Court in Koon sup-
ported, 90 but with some modifications. The test proposes that, for a
district court to justify a departure from the applicable Guideline
range, the judge must satisfy all three parts of the following test:
(1) The circumstances, or factors, of the case make the case spe-
cial, or unusual, compared with other cases falling under the same
Guidelines section.
(2) If the factor is encouraged, the court may depart if the appli-
cable Guideline section does not already take the factor into account.
If the factor is discouraged, or encouraged but already taken into
account by the applicable Guideline section, the court may depart if
the unusual factor is present "to a degree substantially in excess of
that which ordinarily is involved in the offense."' 91
If the factor is not mentioned in the Guidelines, the court may
depart if it finds that the factor was not adequately taken into consid-
eration by the Commission in formulating the applicable Guideline
section, considering "only the sentencing guidelines, policy state-
ments, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission."
92
The court should decide whether the departure is appropriate "after
considering the 'structure and theory of both relevant individual
explicitly said that... it did not "adequately" take unusual cases "into consid-
eration."... [O]nce the court... has properly determined that a case is,
indeed, "unusual," the case becomes a candidate for departure, for the Com-
mission itself has answered the statutory "adequate consideration" question.
United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 947 (1st Cir. 1993). However, an interpretation
which satisfies all the language variations throughout the Guidelines seems more ap-
propriate. See Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 200 (1992):
The Guidelines echo the [Sentencing Reform] Act's instruction that a dis-
trict court may depart from the applicable guideline range only when it finds
an aggravating or mitigating circumstance not adequately taken into consid-
eration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines. Con-
struing the plain language of the Guidelines Manual and the governing
statute, we conclude that it is an incorrect application of the Guidelines for a
district court to depart from the applicable sentencing range based on a
factor that the Commission has already fully considered ....
Id. (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
190 See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
191 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0, p.s. (1995).
192 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1994).
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guidelines and the Guidelines taken as a whole," 93 and keeping in
mind that "such cases will be highly infrequent."
194
(3) The unusual circumstances should result in a departure.
The first and third parts of this test are clearly discretionary deci-
sions best made by the district courts. The second part of this test
could potentially involve questions of law, or an interpretation of a set
of words in the Guidelines, and it is this part which provides the appel-
late courts with the most power to scrutinize a district court's decision.
But as the Supreme Court stated, "[1]ittle turns ... on whether we
label review of [a legal] question abuse of discretion or de novo, for
an abuse of discretion standard does not mean a mistake of law is
beyond appellate correction."' 95 In conformance with the Koon deci-
sion, the de novo portion of this review should not extend to the dis-
cretionary decision of whether the Commission took a particular
factor, as it exists in the case at hand, into account when formulating
the Guidelines.
An example of the use of this test, as it would have applied in the
Koon case, is helpful. In the case of susceptibility to abuse in prison,
the District Court found that the extent of this potential abuse was
great enough to make the case unusual. This decision is discretion-
ary, and as the majority stated, "[t]he ... conclusion that this factor
made the case unusual is just the sort of determination that must be
accorded deference by the appellate courts." 96 Therefore, use of the
factor complies with the first part of the proposed test. Second, since
the factor is not mentioned in the Guidelines, the appellate court
must review whether the Commission took the factor into account in
formulating the applicable Guideline section for violations of civil
rights under color of law. The Commission most likely contemplated
that police officers would be prosecuted under this statute, and their
193 Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2045 (1996) (quoting Rivera, 994 F.2d at
949).
194 U.S. SENTENCING GUmEuNES MANuAL ch. 1, pt. A, cmt. 4(d) (1995). Both parts
one and two of this analysis are required because, although what the Commission has
taken into account includes typical circumstances, the reverse is not always true. An
atypical factor may also have been taken into account by the Commission in formulat-
ing the Guidelines, even though the circumstance occurs only rarely. See, for exam-
ple, Justice Breyer's argument that the factor of double prosecution may be rare, but
was taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission when formulating the
Guideline section corresponding to 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994) (violating constitutional
rights under color of law). It must have been contemplated that this statute would
potentially involve federal proceedings after state prosecution has failed. See Koon,
116 S. Ct. at 2056 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
195 Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2047.
196 Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2053.
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increased potential for abuse in prison would most likely have been
considered. However, the District Court based its decision to depart
upon "[t]he extraordinary notoriety and national media coverage of
this case, coupled with the defendants' status as police officers."
197
Therefore, giving deference to the District Court's determination that
the Commission did not take the circumstances as they exist in the
case into account, the second part is also satisfied.
1 98
The final part of this test is the most difficult for the District
Court to overcome: should these unusual circumstances result in a
downward departure? As Justice Souter pointed out, part of the rea-
son for the great publicity of this case, upon which the District Court
justified the downward departure, "stemmed from the remarkable
brutality of petitioners' proven behavior, which it was their misfortune
to have precisely documented on film."' 99 In that case, departure
would seem to reward the defendants for the criminal acts they were
convicted of. However, an additional part of the "widespread public-
ity and emotional outrage"200 of this case did not stem from Koon and
Powell's proven behavior, but from the state court acquittal and the
violent riots which followed. The defendants were not responsible for
these circumstances surrounding the case, but since the circumstances
contributed to the greater likelihood for prison abuse, perhaps the
factor justified a downward departure. Giving the District Court sub-
stantial deference, the third part of the proposed test would most
likely be considered satisfied. Therefore, the susceptibility to abuse in
prison factor would have been upheld using this test, as it was by the
majority of the Supreme Court.
The test proposed in this Comment more clearly outlines the
analysis a district court must undertake in departure decisions. At the
same time, it places further inherent limitations on the district court's
197 United States v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769, 785-86 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (emphasis
added), affid in part, vacated in part, 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1994), affd in part, rev'd in
part, Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996).
198 Further support for the District Court's determination that it could rely upon
susceptibility to abuse in prison as a valid departure factor, given the structure and
theory of the Guidelines, can be found in the Commission's response to United States
v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1990). The Circuit Court upheld the sentencing
judge's decision to depart downward due to the defendant's susceptibility to abuse in
prison due to his physical appearance. In response, the Commission did not declare
potential for prison abuse an invalid, or forbidden departure factor, but rather the
Commission amended the Guidelines by adding physical appearance as a discouraged
departure factor. See supra note 61.
199 Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2054-55 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
200 Id. at 2054.
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ability to depart from the Guidelines, which should limit departures to
only those cases which truly warrant different sentences from the ma-
jority. This test also gives circuit courts more guidance for their re-
view process and focuses their constraining ability upon the correct
criteria.
In conclusion, departures from the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, and review of those departures, capture the essence of the bal-
ance between the goals of proportionality and uniformity that
Congress originally intended to achieve through the Sentencing Re-
form Act and the Guidelines. This is a delicate balance which re-
quires deference to the trial court's discretionary decisions and an
appropriate check on this discretion by the appellate court. Equilib-
rium between the two can only be achieved through explicit instruc-
tions for the departure process as well as the standard of review. The
Supreme Court, in Koon v. United States, addresses and appropriately
modifies the second requirement. The first remains to be resolved.
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